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Interview
THE URBAN SOUTH AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR
Towers, Frank
Fall 2005
Frank Towers is Associate Professor of History at the University of Calgary,
Alberta, Canada.
Interview with Frank TowersInterview by Frank Winter Hardie
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): What initially drew you to study the
social aspects of the South?
Frank Towers (FT): I had always been interested in the roads-not-taken in
history and aspects of the modern past that seemed not to fit with the modern
world as I knew it in the time and place of my youth--Providence, Rhode Island
during the 1970s. It wasn't a straight line from that inspiration to the history of
Southern cities. I read a lot about what to me seemed to be a different
anti-modern anomaly, the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the Middle East,
North Africa, and southeastern Europe. In some ways the Old South fit the same
set of questions that drew me to the Ottomans. I took in a lot of the romanticism
of the Lost Cause that depicts the South as a region fighting off the
industrializing world that characterizes our own time. In graduate school at the
University of California at Irvine I concentrated on pre-Civil War Southern
history (I chickened out of learning the four or five languages necessary to study
Ottoman history) and realized that there was a vast literature on the question of
whether or not the South was anti-modern, what role slavery played in that
problem, and how unified the white South was in support of slavery and the
social system that went with it. Writing a dissertation about Baltimore in the
1850s seemed like a good test case for what happened to Americans living in a
place that mixed all the elements of the emerging industrial order with slavery
and the political culture of the Old South.
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CWBR: Much of what we know about secession and the South is based on
research of power structures associated with rural, agrarian regions. How can
examination of urban areas within the prewar South enhance our
understanding of the region as a whole regarding slavery and the Civil War?
FT: Looking at Southern cities is important for at least two reasons. First,
they were there and they were becoming more important every year. Despite our
image of the Old South as a rural monolith, in 1860 one in 12 Southerners lived
in a city. Just under one million people lived in the 25 largest slave-state cities on
the eve of the Civil War. Southern cities grew faster than the South's rural
population between 1840 and 1860, and by 1860 slave-state cities housed
factories, banks, and marketplaces that commercial sectors of the rural economy
could not live without. All of this seems a little surprising if we get locked into a
way of looking at the sectional conflict as a clash between diametrically opposed
societies.
Southern cities also merit attention because they expose the complex
relationship between free labor and slavery, and they open a window onto the
South's adaptation to the modern industrial world. Recent scholarship on the
urban South shows that cities and slavery could go together under the right
conditions. Slavery was on the way out in some cities, Baltimore being the best
example, but it was actually growing in others, like Richmond, where cigar and
iron makers used slaves in their factories. Furthermore, free laborers in the cities
sometimes fought against slavery, but at other times they sought to make the
institution stronger as a means for protecting their own privileges. That finding
challenges the belief that slavery and modernity were at odds with each other.
CWBR: How did the Southern style of free labor politics relate to the
politics of slavery?
FT: We should make a distinction between the political behavior of the
South's free wage workers and the southern variant of free-labor ideology. As an
ideology, free labor is usually associated with the North and the Republican
Party. Proponents of free labor ideology argued that all wealth ultimately derived
from human labor and that therefore labor had a moral right to be fairly
compensated for its effort. This idea had many adherents in the 1800s.
Economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx called it the
labor theory of value. Abraham Lincoln expressed it in Biblical terms as God's
injunction that in the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread. In the late 1850s
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Lincoln and the Republicans fit this idea into a broad ranging critique of the
slave power as a threat to the liberty and living standards of ordinary Americans.
On its face, free labor ideology was antislavery because slaveholders
withheld from slaves the fruits of their labor. However, proslavery politicians
found ways to fit free labor ideas into a defense of slavery and an attack on the
North. One of the best examples of this line of reasoning is James Henry
Hammond's mudsill argument, which he articulated in an 1858 speech to the
U.S. Senate. Hammond combined the commonly held white belief that African
Americans ranked below whites with the proslavery assertion that low-skilled
manual work degraded those who performed it. According to Hammond, slaves
and only slaves performed the most oppressive forms of manual labor thereby
allowing poor whites to take skilled jobs that brought the fair reward and livable
wage that free labor deserved. Without slavery, Hammond and others like him
warned, white labor would be forced into the degradation experienced by slaves.
This is a long way of saying that under the right circumstances, free labor
politics could be compatible with the politics of slavery.
Similarly, proslavery politicians could sometimes make allies of free wage
laborers, but for the most part the political behavior of Southern free white labor
ran counter to the interests of slaveholders. In the 1850s, cities housed the
biggest concentrations of enfranchised wage workers, and they voted for
candidates who promoted their concerns in opposition to the wishes of
planter-politicians who dominated Southern state legislatures. Although the
South's white workers rarely criticized slavery directly, they opposed planters in
other ways, such as demanding decreased legislative representation for
plantation counties, raising taxes on land and slaves, spending taxes on
job-creating and city-building public works, and preventing police and militia
from disrupting strikes. Proslavery politicians understood this threat. Among
many proslavery motives for secession, fire eaters hoped that disunion would cut
labor-influenced Southern municipal administrations off from potential allies in
the federal government.
CWBR: With the influx of immigrants, Jacksonian party politics became
outmoded in the 1840s and '50s. How did this affect the urban South in light
of the Southern tradition of paternalism?
FT: European immigration helped push the cities onto a different political
and social course from the rest of the South. In 1860, one half of the South's
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foreign born whites lived in its ten largest cities and two fifths lived in the three
largest (Baltimore, New Orleans, and St. Louis). Whereas the rural South was
overwhelmingly American born, immigrants made up one quarter to one half of
big-city populations.
Most of these immigrants came from failing farms in Germany and Ireland
in search of any job they could find in the U.S. In the early 1800s, Southern
cities were small enough to accommodate a variant of the master-servant
paternalistic work relationship idealized by proslavery writers. Immigration
brought thousands of newcomers, many of whom had poor command of English,
to the urban workplace and made the old face-to-face patron-client style of labor
management ineffective. Their presence weakened the social authority of
employers who earlier had used slaves and coercive controls over free blacks to
divide urban labor along racial lines.
Immigration also affected politics by contributing to the breakup of
Jacksonian era party competition in the early 1850s. Along with the inability of
Whigs and Democrats to amicably resolve the sectional controversy, their failure
to adequately address labor's concerns about immigrant competition undermined
their popularity in the urban South. In their place rose the American Party, also
called Know Nothings, who campaigned vigorously against immigration and
immigrant labor. The American Party's nativism and indulgence of labor radicals
created a new constituency for Democrats, who sought to rebuild the urban
paternalist alliance between employers and unskilled labor, this time by allying
proslavery businessmen with unskilled immigrants.
CWBR: The anti-immigrant Know Nothing Party used white supremacy to
rally support within urban areas. How did Know Nothing politicians reconcile
this with the fact that slavery undermined the labor opportunities of native
poor whites?
FT: The South's urban Know Nothings were caught on the horns of a
dilemma in regard to slavery. On the one hand, their constituency--native-born
wage labor--resented the power of slaveholders and allied employers. On the
other, no politician got far defying the proslavery norm of Southern politics. The
Know Nothings fashioned their own style of proslavery free labor ideology to
reconcile the political culture of the slave states with urban white workers'
demand that government do something to protect them from competing with
cheap labor in all forms be it immigrant, convict, free black, or enslaved.
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The Know Nothing argument on slavery and job competition followed the
general Southern line that slaves and white workers did not compete directly,
and to the extent that they did, slavery protected white workers from performing
the worst forms of manual labor. To build support with white workers upset at
the power of slaveholders and competition from slaves, American Party leaders
argued that slaves should be kept out of desirable jobs that white workers could
perform. In the end, this meant almost all jobs in the cities except domestic
service.
New Orleans Know Nothings made good use of this argument in the 1858
mayoral elections which pitted their candidate against P.G.T. Beauregard, an
army officer and head of the customs office who would go to several prominent
commands in the Confederate war effort. In constructing a new customs house,
Beauregard had used slaves in place of white labor. Know Nothings criticized
this decision as evidence of Beauregard's aristocratic disregard for ordinary
whites.
Because slave numbers were low in the largest cities, white labor's
immediate concerns about job competition focused primarily on immigrants and
free blacks. Know Nothings championed restricting immigration and facilitated
job-busting purges of free black labor from high-paying skilled jobs, as occurred
in a series of riots on Baltimore's docks in 1858 and 1859. Nativism also fed into
the proslavery American Party argument. Know Nothings claimed that
immigrants, especially German refugees from the Revolution of 1848, were
abolitionists. Therefore, proscriptions against immigrants defended slavery.
CWBR: The advent of the Civil War marked the beginning of Democrat
domination in most of the South. How did this affect the South's largest cities?
FT: Democratic Party domination, which began in the 1850s and, excepting
Reconstruction, lasted for a century, had the ironic effect of making the South's
cities less supportive of Democrats. In the 1830s and 1840s when Whigs and
Democrats competed fairly evenly across the South, the Democrats often did
well in cities because urban workers, a big chunk of the local electorate,
supported Andrew Jackson's common man appeal and his attack on aristocratic
privilege as manifest in his war against the Bank of the United States. Business
support for Whigs helped Democrats claim that they best represented the
interests of urban workers. Furthermore in states where Whigs controlled state
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government, like Maryland and Louisiana, municipal Democrats stood for
opposition to rural domination.
This pattern changed in the 1850s. The collapse of the Whigs early in the
decade drove most of the South's planters into the Democratic Party and gave
Democrats majorities in most Southern state legislatures. Solid planter support
for Democrats undermined urban Democrats' standing as anti-aristocrats, and the
new power of rural Democratic districts made the party less responsive to the
needs of urban voters. As a result, city politics underwent its own voter
realignment. By 1860, the urban business elite had switched from Whig to
Democrat to curry favor with rural power brokers and to oppose labor militants
in the opposition parties. Urban workers dropped the Democrats in favor of
Know Nothings and other anti-Democrat alternatives.
In the secession crisis urban voters attached long-running municipal feuds to
sectional issues and some odd alliances resulted, such as the affinity that many
penniless immigrants felt for secessionist Democrats who had defended them
from Know Nothing nativists. On the other side, some working-class Know
Nothings, who had exhibited little interest in antislavery and often vilified the
Republican Party, supported the Union because they hated the urban Democrats
who backed secession.
CWBR: In our own time, New Orleans, St. Louis, and Baltimore seem
more politically and socially pluralistic and less Southern than other Southern
cities. How and why did this happen?
FT: When I was researching this topic, people who I met in Baltimore, St.
Louis, and New Orleans sometimes asked why I considered these places fit
subjects for Southern history. These days Baltimore and St. Louis are more
identified with the mid-Atlantic and the Midwest, and New Orleans has longed
been regarded as the Deep South's eccentric exception; the closest place
Southerners can go to get away from the South.
That doesn't mean Southerners consider all cities as alien places. Atlanta,
Richmond, Mobile are part of the South, as is the border city of Louisville,
Kentucky. To understand why the cities that ranked as the slave states' three
largest in 1860 seem somehow not Southern we have to go back to the politics of
the 1850s. Because it was in that decade of intense sectional conflict that
proslavery writers and politicians articulated the enduring definition of the South
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as a distinctive region.
By defining the South as a distinct region, if not nation, secessionists
buttressed their claim to act for purposes higher than merely protecting planters'
power and wealth. The fire eaters who brought the South out of the Union
wanted to unify the white South behind their leadership. This was not an easy
task. Three fourths of white southern families owned no slaves, and the late
antebellum South consisted of a patchwork of different economies, demographic
groupings, and climates. This diversity forced secessionists to develop
arguments that went beyond a pure interest-based appeal to the profits tied up in
slave ownership.
According to secessionists, slavery and white independence were the
interrelated cornerstones of what it meant to be Southern. They juxtaposed an
idealized South of independent white yeomen against the impoverished
industrial workers in big cities, the most visible symbol of white dependence in
the mid-19th century. Proslavery propagandists like George Fitzhugh and J.D.B.
DeBow pointed to the degraded condition of factory hands in Lowell,
Massachusetts, and Manchester, England, and to riots perpetrated by urban mobs
in New York and Philadelphia. The industrial cities of the North and Europe, fire
eaters claimed, produced chaos and misery, whereas the South's cities were
smaller, exclusively commercial places that serviced the staple crop economy of
the countryside. No satanic mills or disorderly mobs would plague the South
because the South had slavery and agriculture to protect whites from such
scenes.
It was at this point in the secessionist narrative of Southern nationalism that
Baltimore, New Orleans, and St. Louis created problems. Because these very
large cities housed industry and rowdy working-class mobs secessionists sought
to define them as not Southern. To admit that the South had the same big cities
as the North and Europe would undermine the claim that slavery somehow
created a social reality for whites that differed from what modernity was
bringing to the rest of the western world.
The ideological case for what was and was not Southern had been
established in the 1850s. The Civil War furthered these arguments because the
white masses in Baltimore and St. Louis demonstrated for the Union and
volunteered for federal military service. In Reconstruction, New Orleans, which
also produced thousands of wartime Unionists, became a bastion for radical
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Republicans. During the Jim Crow era, the big cities continued to experience
competitive elections and maintained a semblance of the partisan politics that
had developed before 1861 even as the rest of the South reverted to one-party
Democratic domination.
Southerners could find all the excitements of city life in other urban places
after 1865, including new cities like Birmingham, and fast growing ones like
Nashville and Atlanta. Most Southerners called these cities their own because
they remained within the political orthodoxy of the one-party South.
The Civil War era history of Baltimore, New Orleans and St. Louis brings
out the fundamentally political character of the question of Southern identity.
Secessionists and later Lost Cause enthusiasts had a political purpose in mind
when they wrote about the South as a distinctive region characterized by rural
living and white supremacy, but they waged this political battle on the cultural
ground of regional identity. Although secessionists lost the Civil War, they won
a lot back during the peace that followed. Writing big cities out of Southern
history is one of many outcomes of that victory.
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